Security

  Text :  

Multiple Flaws in Axesstel MV 410R

by Filip Palian <filip (dot) palian (at) pjwstk (dot) edu (dot) pl

Description:
Axesstel MV 410R is a device offered by the two leading polish telecom
operators Orange and Polish Telecom to provide broadband Internet in CDMA
technology and it's already widely in use.

Overview:
Axesstel MV 410R firmware and its default configuration has many flaws,
which allows remote unauthorized access to device and the internal network
behind it.

#1 Access from the Internet to device enabled by default Anyone is able to
automatically detect devices, which are online and conduct the attack. It's
simplified even more as the oparator IP address space is reserved for the
services using this device.

#2 No HTTPS support for the web interface
Communication to the web interface can be sniffed by the attacker.

#3 System doesn't force administrator to change default password upon first
login Many administrators leave it unchanged.

#4 Brute-force attack on admin account Login attempts are not limited at
all.

#5 Denial of Service
It's trivial to conduct a successful SYN flood attack from WAN and LAN.

#6 Wi-Fi encryption is disabled by default Communication in the LAN can be
sniffed by the attacker.
#7 SSID broadcast is enabled by default Anyone can connect to the LAN
without any problems.

#8 Input data validation
Validation in the web interface is realised by the JavaScript. Disabling it
in the browser allows for inputing malicious content.

#9 Executing CGI scripts via GET method
It is possible to pass parameters directly to the CGI scripts via GET
method. It bypasses JavaScript validation and simplifies the attack. For
example execution of

"http://192.168.0.1/cgi-bin/sysconf.cgi?RESTORE=RESTORE" (user
confirmation not needed) will reset device to default configuration.

#10 Permanent XSS
It's possible to plant permanent XSS in the web interface using
"http://192.168.0.1/cgi-bin/sysconf.cgi" script.

#11 Automatic redirection
Some scripts do the automatic redirection after execution. This feature may
be used to hide for example a CSRF attack. evilsite.com leads to
"http://192.168.0.1/cgi-bin/wireless.cgi" where script is
executed and it autoredirects back to evilsite.com.

Status:
At the moment no fixes were provided by the vendor. As a workaround
administrator should:
#1 restrict access to device only from LAN
#2 change the default administrator password (still can be sniffed in LAN)
#3 enable Wi-Fi encryption
#4 turn on clients MAC addresses filtering
#5 turn off SSID broadcasting

Disclousure timeline:
11 V 2009: Detailed information with examples and PoCs sent to vendor
(cert_at_telekomunikacja&#[46];pl).
12 V 2009: Initial vendor response.
19 V 2009: Question about the status sent to the vendor.
19 V 2009: No reasonable response from the vendor.
9 VI 2009: Question about the status sent to the vendor.
No response.
16 VI 2009: Notification that bulletin will be released send to the
vendor.
17 VI 2009: No reasonable response from the vendor.
19 VI 2009: Last notification that bulletin will be released send to the
vendor.
No response.
23 VI 2009: Last notification that bulletin will be released send to the
vendor.
No response: "<cert_at_telekomunikacja&#]46;pl>: host
mailin.tpsa.pl[212.160.172.68] said: 451 Unable
to contact LDAP".
25 VI 2009: Last and final notification that bulletin will be released
send to the vendor.
No response.
02 VII 2009: Security bulletin released.
Response: ?

Rationale:
The vendor hasn't responded neither responsibly nor reasonably within 34
working days. The bulletin was released in hope that users will be able to
protect themselves against these serious threats before vendor will realese
fixes and before the bad guys will reach them first.

Links:
* http://orange.pl/
* http://tp.pl/
* http://www.axesstel.com/


Best regards,
Filip Palian

  References :  

http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2009/Jul/0016.html