This is regardless of magic_quotes_gpc settings because we have
stripslashes on
"template" argument (this is exploitable on PHP 4, because file_exists()
function suffers of null char injection...)
File comptemt is passed to an eval() in includes/template.php, so it is
evaluated as php code.
Also we can upload malicious php code through 4images functionalities
inside a
.jpg file with well crafted EXIF metadata comtempt.
Example of remote code execution:
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still a note about:
http://secunia.com/advisories/19026/
Secunia wrote: "Input passed to the "template" parameter in "index.php"
isn't
properly verified, before it is used to include files. This can be
exploited to
include files having the template file extension (".html") from local
resources
via directory traversal attacks"
and classified it as low risk... this is true on PHP5 but not on PHP4 where
you
can break the .html extension by a null char
site: http://retrogod.altervista.org
mail: rgod at autistici.org
original advisory: http://retrogod.altervista.org/4images_171_adv.html
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