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| Details : SecurityAlert |
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Topic : | Bypassing ASP .NET "ValidateRequest" for Script Injection Attacks
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SecurityAlert : 4193
CVE : CVE-2008-3842 CVE : CVE-2008-3843 CWE : CWE-79
SecurityRisk : Low (About)
Remote Exploit : Yes
Local Exploit : No
Victim interaction required : Yes
Exploit Given : No
Credit : ProCheckUp Research;
Published : 28.08.2008
Affected Software : | Microsoft, .net_framework, 1.0, Service Pack 3;
Microsoft, .net_framework, 1.1, Service Pack 1;
Microsoft, .net_framework, 2.0; |
 Advisory Text : -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
The Microsoft .NET framework comes with a request validation feature,
configurable by the ValidateRequest setting. ValidateRequest has been a
feature of ASP.NET since version 1.1. This feature consists of a series
of filters, designed to prevent classic web input validation attacks
such as HTML injection and XSS (Cross-site Scripting). This paper
introduces script injection payloads that bypass ASP .NET web validation
filters and also details the trial-and-error procedure that was followed
to reverse-engineer such filters by analyzing .NET debug errors.
The original version of this paper was released in January 2006 for
private CPNI distribution. This paper has now been updated in August
2008 to include additional materials such as input payloads that bypass
the latest anti-XSS .NET patches (MS07-40) released in July 2007.
Paper:
http://www.procheckup.com/PDFs/bypassing-dot-NET-ValidateRequest.pdf
Advisory:
http://www.procheckup.com/Vulnerability_PR08-20.php
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References :
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/archive/1/495667/100/0/threaded
http://www.procheckup.com/PDFs/bypassing-dot-NET-ValidateRequest.pdf
Feedback :
If you have additional information or notice any errors regarding this security advisory, please use contact form or email us at info()securityreason()com.
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