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  Tytuł : Netgear DG632 Router Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
  WLB : WLB-2009070003  (Szczegóły)
  Data publikacji : 2009-07-02
  Autor          : Tom Neaves
  Dodane przez     : SecurityReason
  Poziom ryzyka : Wysoki  Poziom Wysoki  (Szczegóły)
  Zdalny błąd : Tak
  Lokalny błąd : Nie
  Status   : Bład

  Historia :
[2009-07-02] Publikacja

  Podatne oprogramowanie :  

Netgear DG632


  Tekst :  

Product Name: Netgear DG632 Router
Vendor: http://www.netgear.com
Date: 15 June, 2009
Author: tom (at) tomneaves.co (dot) uk
Original URL:
http://www.tomneaves.co.uk/Netgear_DG632_Authentication_Bypass.txt
Discovered: 18 November, 2006
Disclosed: 15 June, 2009

I. DESCRIPTION

The Netgear DG632 router has a web interface which runs on port 80. This
allows an admin to login and administer the device's settings.
Authentication of this web interface is handled by a script called "webcm"
residing in "/cgi-bin/" which redirects to the relevant pages depending on
successful user authentication. Vulnerabilities in this interface enable an
attacker to access files and data without authentication.

II. DETAILS

The "webcm" script handles user authentication and attempts to load
"indextop.htm" (via javascript below). The "indextop.htm" page requires
authentication (HTTP Basic Authorization).

---

<script language="javascript" type="text/javascript">
function loadnext() {
//document.forms[0].target.value="top";
document.forms[0].submit();
//top.location.href="../cgi-bin/webcm?nextpage=../html/indextop.htm";
}</script></head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" onload="loadnext()" >

Loading file ...
<form method="POST" action="../cgi-bin/webcm" id="uiPostForm">
<input type="hidden" name="nextpage" value="../html/indextop.htm"
id="uiGetNext">
</form>

---

If a valid password to the default "admin" user is supplied, the script
then continues to load the "indextop.htm" page and continues to load the
other frames based on a hidden field. If user authentication is
unsuccessful, the user is returned back to "../cgi-bin/webcm". It is
possible to bypass the "webcm" script and access specific files directly
without the need for authentication.

Normal use:
http://TARGET_IP/cgi-bin/webcm?nextpage=../html/stattbl.htm

This would ask for the user to authenticate and would refuse access to this
file if authentication details were not known. All the script is doing is
making sure authentication is forced upon the user.
The same "stattbl.htm" file can be accessed without having to provide any
authentication using the following URL:

http://TARGET_IP/html/stattbl.htm

Another example:
http://192.168.0.1/cgi-bin/webcm?nextpage=../html/modemmenu.htm
(returns 401 - Forbidden)

Bypassing the "webcm" script:
http://192.168.0.1/html/modemmenu.htm
(returns 200 - OK)

In the example above (modemmenu.htm), the full source can be viewed which
discloses further directories and files within the javascript of the page.
A sample of files disclosed
within modemmenu.htm and available to download are:

/html/onload.htm
/html/form.css
/gateway/commands/saveconfig.html
/html/utility.js (full source)

There are many other files that are accessible by calling them directly
instead of going via the "webcm" script, the above are just a sample. In
addition, it is possible to specify paths to
the "webcm" script as shown below:

http://TARGET_IP/cgi-bin/webcm?nextpage=../../

This allows an attacker to enumerate what files and directories exist
within the www root directory and beyond by using 200, 403 and 404 errors
as a guide.

Affected Versions: Firmware V3.4.0_ap (others unknown)

III. VENDOR RESPONSE

12 June, 2009 - Contacted vendor.
15 June, 2009 - Vendor responded. Stated the DG632 is an end of life
product and is no longer supported in a production and development sense,
as such, there will
be no further firmware releases to resolve this issue.

IV. CREDIT

Discovered by Tom Neaves


  Referencje :  

none


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